Journal of Academia, The Royal Academy of Morocco, No 13, 1996


Every foreign policy begins at home, reflects its internal situation. The foreign policy of a state, its strength, weakness, vulnerability also mirror internal aspects of a geopolitical situation. The latter dictates foreign policy. In other words: on the international arena no country can be stronger than at home.

At present the foreign policy of Russia is going through a tremendous change of revolutionary proportions. On the post-soviet territory there exists a completely new geopolitical situation. This process is in a state of a flux, instability, quite often even chaos. We witness long and painful transition from the foreign policy of a superpower to a lower status which is still difficult to define.

Russia is a nuclear power with formidable but at the same time greatly reduced military capabilities. Its industry is in deep crises, social and political situation is tense. It is useless nowadays to explain the foreign policy of Russia by merely extrapolating soviet foreign policy. The past achievements, failures and possibilities influence the present russian diplomacy. Internal changes in the country are so huge that they make the foreign policy of Moscow quite flexible, sometimes to the point of unpredictibility. For this policy it will take, perhaps, a decade to be adjusted to Russia's national interests.

Due to this unique stage of Russia's internal development I am compelled to look into its basic features. They explain not only modifications of the russian foreign policy towards the world of Islam but also its geostrategy.

Understanding Russian History.

Many people tnink of Russia as an integrated part of the western civilization. For the last three centuries the flight of russian dreams and actions often went westward. The foreign policy of Moscow was engaged with opening a window to Europe, consolidating Russia's influence in the Baltic and the Black sea regions, the Balkans, Estern and Central Europe.

The defeat of Napoleon's army in 1812 brought russian gussars and cossacs to Paris. We are reminded of that by numerous paris bistros, the name which probably derives from the russian "Быстро" ("quickly"), which was thrown at the face of french waitresses by thirsty russian officers and soldiers.

Russian history, religion, culture and mentality were intensivly exposed to the impact of the West. Russia was also torn by many wars which came from the West, including two world wars. Russia witnessed many battles, victories and defeats, joy, grief and sorrow. One of the most remembered both in Russia and in the West is Crimean war of 1854 and the Sevastopol battle.

Russian church is also a part of the western christian civilization and at the same time the mentor of russian soul.

A powerful cosmopolitic marxist ideology, with a strong influence of Vladimir Lenin's thoughts and actions, was a sort of a western inspired experiment in Russia and brought it eventually a status of a superpower.

Then came a man-made destruction of the Soviet Union, which was the main counterpart of the West for a long time. On the surface of events it seems that the soviet power has suffered a fatal blow. To my best knowledge such judgement may be premature. Its powerful heir may gradually reemerge.

There are developments in Russia that point to a conclusion - in the Russian Federation a new civilization is emerging. Instead of "a russian" I would call it "rossiyskaya"
civilization, internationally yet to be understood and recognized. The explanation of this definition is quite simple.

For example, for almost a century all comers from the Soviet Union were called "russians". Expressions as "russian revolution", "russian menace", "the russians are coming" and the latest "the new russians" became household words. They are misleading. The socialist revolution in Russia was multinational by nature and communist leaders were mostly non-russians. The brutal civil war started in 1918, when "the reds" were fighting "the whites", the latter led mostly by russian generals. As to "new russians" and "russian mafia", there are few ethnic russians connected with them.

Today the post-soviet Russia is going through a difficult period of adjustment. The country is redefining its spheres of influence. In the course of this process a new geostrategy comes to the fore and, hopely, a new national ideology - a contemporary Eurasianis.

Russia and Islam.

On the russian soil Islam was officially adopted in 922 by bulgars and later by tartars and bashkirs. Nowadays out of 150 peoples, inhibiting Russia, 40 follow Islam. 90% of Russia's population are slavs and turks. Adherents of Islam constitute not less than 10% of Russia's population or about 15 mln people.

In seven republics of the Federation, where endemic population is muslim, russian population is from 30 to 75%. Migration of muslims to Russia from Central Asia and Caucasus is on the rise. For example, in 1989 in Moscow there were about 250 thousand muslims, in 1996 - 800 thousands. In the policonfessional world Russia is unique in a sense that it has no history of religious wars. In many russian cities up to 80% of tartars are married to russians.

At present in Russia russian orthodox christians, muslims, buddists and judaists conduct an extensive dialogue and represent four world religions. They are in search of a common ground.

At the same time not a few mass circulation editions, TV and radio stations distort the image of Islam and try to explain it as an ideology of fanatism and extremism. An expression "islamic terrorism" is one of the most dangerous stereotypes that poisons internal situation in Russia and the World.

Antimuslim vulgar politics breeds totalitarianism and is an enemy of Eurasianism. The latter is a sound base for uniting Russia and a peaceful russian foreign policy.

Russia is a part of Islam world. At the same time its policy towards Islam as religion, a way of life and civilization is still in the making. Developments in "russian umma" are to a large extent influenced from abroad. This impact is diverse and often conflicting. "Rossiiskiy islam" is of different colors.

In Russia tarikata Islam teachings are widespread and based on moderation and desire of compromise. They reflect years of progmatic cooperation with administrative civil structures.

Tensions, it seems, are strongly defined by local political cultures. To stabilize further situation in Russia, differences of political cultures in various regions should be taken into account. Any rush to force leads to counter reaction and more force.

In Russia we are still to witness the appearance of nation-wide acknowledged muslim leaders and statemen who understand the power of moderation. One of the most difficult points for present antisocialists in the government is to comprehend that Islam embraces the concept of social justice as a will of all-powerful Allah.

The Russian government must be very careful not to fall into a trap of "christian-muslim clash of civilizations". Allarmism and confrontation towards muslims must cease to exist in the russian foreign and domestic policy, pragmatism and desire of compromise must prevail. Moscow plans to establish excellent relations with all countries of Islam. Russia Orthodox Church and Islam in Russia are allies and friends. United they will never be manipulated against each other both from inside or outside.


This concept appeared in Russia one hundred years ago. Its main idea was a belief that there exists a policentric civilization between Europe and Asia. The theoretical base of Eurasianism repels any separatist and confrontational views and actions. The strength of Eurasianism derives from the history of Tsarist Russia, where inter-cultural influence often overcame geopolitical, ethnic and religious barriers.

In the Soviet Union the development of Eurasianism theory was halted by official introduction of marxism-leninism, based on an idea of a class struggle. Marxist-based system survived Stalin's brutality and in the second half of the XX-th century guided the soviet society.

Polyethnic Russian empire stretched from Eastern Europe in the West to the Pacific Ocean in the East and from Arctic to China, Afganistan, Iran and Turkey. The soviet people was not a mechanical sum of national cultures. Their development represented a fruitful synthesis of western and estern civilizations. This process of mutual assimilation was reflected in the soviet multinational culture.

Nowadays Eurasian superculture continues to develop in the Russian Federation. This development faces many difficulties. The main danger is a phenomenon of hyperethnicity when the right of any people to self-determination is taken to the extreme. At the same time the world practice and theories do not recognize an absolute power of any ethnic group for independence. To impose this absolute power upon Rossiiskaya Federation and simultaneously deny the same right to peoples of Western Europe or America creates a double standart situation.

Eurasian geopolitical integrity of Russia can be defended only by opposing both external and internal forces, especially radical nationalism, including russian nationalism. The alternative is the destruction of Russia in nearly the same way that happened to the USSR.

At present the words pronounced by a famous russian scientist Lev Gumilev almost a centure ago sound prophetic: "Russia may only be saved as a Eurasian power and only through Eurasianism."

"Crises of civilizations" theory is supported not only by developments in the Soviet Union and Russia but also in the West, where there is a widespread feeling that integrity of life "gradually dissapears". International environment and human civilization go through tremendous changes. Global human civilization experiences many shocks. There seems to be no "Invisible Hand" which helps humans to overcome without much pain and blood the complexities of social development.

In theory most scientists agree that global human civilization should be "a world of diversity", "unity in diversity". In art such approach by talented artists brings to life real masterpieces. Do we experience even a rustle of such miracle in real political, global and regional actions?

Today we witness, if to push aside all kinds of stereotypes, which in a nutshell can be described as "good and bad guys" scenarios, a bubbling activity of some political actors in international relations. We see a strong desire to create a "one polar world", dominated by USA and NATO. Such ambitions of the West, coupled with national inferiority complex in the East, lead to endless international problems and conflicts, including an emergence of a menacing theory that proclaims: civilizations can and will clash with each other.

Eurasianism theory and practice is a powerful mean to stabilize Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States through the use of common sense and pragmatic foreign policy.

Rossiiskaya Federation.

Russia is a polyethnic state. It is a largest federation in the world and has 89 subjects and 2.491
administrative-territorial units. The subjects belong to five different types state-territorial entities: 21 republics, 49 regions (oblast), 6 territories (krai) and two cities of federal significance - Moscow and St.Petersburg. There is one autonomous region (the Jewish Autonomous Region in the Far East) and 10 autonomous districs (okrug). In theory republics and autonomous units were created on an ethnic basis, other subjects - on a territorial basis. Such complex territorial and ethnic-linguistic structure brings to mind the brake up of the USSR, Yugoslavia, Czeckoslovakia and Nigeria.

The ethnic base for the federation seems to be quite fragile and insecure. For this reason a lot of politicians and politologists in Russia are in favour of organizing the federation on a territorial basis and even call for the establishment of a unitary state.

Rejection of Eurasianism creates rome for demands that russians need their own state. Many people see this as the only way to avoid regional separatism. Centrifugal trends may be curbed only by uniting desires and wishes of all citizens.

Geopolitics of oil.

Relations of Russia with muslim states are extremely important, they constitute a decisive factor in consolidating and promoting one of three most urgent geopolitical strategies facing Moscow: relations with the West, especially NATO countries; eastern strategy, at the core of which lies a necessity to improve relations with China; southern strategy, aimed at establishing a vast zone of stability in relations with countries of Islam.

The southern geostrategy for Russia is of outstanding importance, a key to success of its foreign policy as a whole. Such an opinion is based on geopolitical reality, when a central factor for stabilization of Russia itself is the cteation of a stable peace in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

1) New "great game"?

In the XIX-th century Russia, Britain and Turkey competed for a decisive influence in both above-mentioned regions. Russia took an upper hand. The USSR seemed to be a fortress which consolidated its hold on the Caucasus and Central Asia forever. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union the whole situation to the East and the West of the Caspian sea changed dramaticaly.

The old "Great Game" of strong and even cruel competition seems to be back. It may reconstruct hard fighting in the area, deep involvement of old and new actors. The new geopolitics of oil ang gas seems to be a predominant factor in this situation.

The oil deposits of the Caspian sea are estimated to reach from 100 to 200 billion barrels worth at present prices not less than 4 trillion US dollars. The foreign policy of Russia is aimed at securing for itself at least a part of this wealth. Russian allies in "geopolitics of oil" are Iran and Turkmenistan.

The new dimension to this geopolitical situation is deep envolvement into oil politics by the USA oil interests. The voice of american diplomacy, when it speaks of russian interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia, especciallt caspian oil, becomes rather stern. There is a growing feeling in Russia that a honeymoon period in Moscow's relations with Washington is coming to an end.

Such conclusions are fed not only by NATO expension to the East and into the Balkans, by its implicite intentions to incorporate Baltic states and Ukraine into the military allience, but also by understanding that with the help from Georgia and Azerbaidjan the USA will do everything to secure its oil interests in the caspian region. In the near future Russia may be subjected to a strong political pressure that will aim at showing Moscow its real place in the new "Big Game". Such pressure already began, a message from USA State Department is - CIS will follow, go the same way as the Soviet Union and cease to exist unless follow new rules, in other words "behave or else".

Soft russian diplomacy, accompanied by economic stagnation, internal instability and weakened armed forces, gives little hope that Moscow will be able to conduct an active foreign policy, designed to secure the Caucasus and Central Asia as its vital spheres of influence. It is difficult for Russia to play a dominant role in oil geopolitics. This role is now in the hands of immense financial groups which have the backing of the USA government and NATO.

The geostrategic offensive of the West in the Caucasus, Caspian region and Central Asia will have tremendous influence on international relations. It will bring the politics of oil inside traditional russian sphere of influence and affect the geostrategy of Moscow in the years to come. It will intensify Russia's search for new alliences, including the states to the south of its borders and in the arab world. In the future the USA may lose Russia as it lost China. The arragance of power helps in short-term planning but later brings negative results.

"Three circles" of the Russian Foreign Policy.

Russia's relations with muslim countries are of great importance. A legacy was left to Moscow from the soviet foreign policy, especially in the military field. The soviets were an important supplier of weapons, on its part they imported agricultural and light industry goods, oil for reexport.

The soviet foreign policy was ideologically aimed at the countries of national liberation and socialist orientation. In the 70-s and 80-s it became more progmatic. The same lopsidedness was also a feature of the USA foreign policy. With the break up of the two-polar world and the appearence of one polar and multipolar trends international relations changed dramaticaly.

For Russia the problem nowadays is not an ideology but its visible absence. In the foreign policy the pressure of the marxist ideology is out but a substitute is still to appear. The destination of its diplomacy in the Middle East and Central Asia is unclear. Due to reduced russian influence in the region of "near-abroad", redivision of geopolitical post-soviet space is in the making.

Moscow's diplomacy under Evgeniy Primakov bacame more active and even effective. A new russian foreign policy is taking hold. Present realities are such that president Yeltsin declared: "Russia must go to the East." This trend becomes even more important, when we consider geostrategy to the south of russian borders and beyond the Caucasus and Central Asia. Russia's relations with Iran, Turkey, Afganistan will also influence the future of the Kremlin's and muslim countries relations. The latter are taking form in "three circles": situation at home and the fate of eurasianism; consolidation and cooperation in CIS; relations with "far abroad", especially arab states.

Case-study. The Caucasus.

The most acute regional conflict facing Russia is the situation in the Caucasus. The region is inhibited by more than fifty large and small ethnic enteties, among them georgians and armenians, who are christians, all the other - muslims: aguls, avars, dargins, laks, lezgians, rutuls, tabasarans, tsakhurs (in Dagestan, subject of the Russian Federation). Islamic faith is followed by abhaz, adygeys, chechens, cherkess, ingushes, kabardins, osetins and others.

In the Caucasus there are two christians CIS states: Georgia and Armenia and one muslim - Azerbaijan, ethnicly turkic. A long war was waged between the latter and Armenia for the possession of Nagorny-Karabach region. Administrativly it is a part of Azerbaidjan but ethnicly populated mainly by armenians.

A small nation on the shores of the Black sea - Abhazia is striving to get an independence from Georgia. South Osetia also wants to cesseed from Georgia and join North Osetia, an entity of Russia. Tense relations exist between two subjects of Russia - North Osetia and Ingushetia. The most difficult problem facing Russia is the situation in Chechnya. The idea of its independence was promoted by russian liberal-minded politicians, who favoured the brake-up of the Soviet Union.

The "independence" of Chechnya was proclaimed by Dudaev's regime in 1990, when the feud between soviet President Gorbachev and president of Russia Yeltsin was at its height. Believe it or not, but in Moscow nobody at that time took serious notice of separatists. Dudaev promised to turn Chechnya into "another Kuwait", he thought that oil alone could be enough for that. The reality was different. There was no law and order in the region. Thousands of russians, kalmyks and even chechens left Chechnya. In this tense situation Moscow made the biggest blunder of all and began to wage war against its own citizens.

In accordance with international standarts the absolute right to independence does not exist. Separatism, dissolusion of states, carried without complience with constitutional laws usually lead to war. Such events, for example, led to the Civil was in the USA in 1861-65, which was caused by secession of Southern states. Historical, juridical and moral judgements on any civil war are so complicated that no one must expect any sympathy while civil population is killed en masse.

Russian Second Caucasus war took place in Chechnya and was, in fact, lost. Russian leadership proved to be weak and inefficient. Moscow's prestige on the international arena was severely damaged. This conflict ended through efforts of general Alexandr Lebed and he immidiately became for different parts of the russian community both "hero" and "traitor" at the same time.

There is a strong feeling in Russia that some way must be found from the mess that the country got in. The best way for Moscow to stabilize the whole situation is to cultivate civil society in Russia, develop national consciousness in the Federation, to do away with irresponcibility of power, display great patioence in talks that take place between Russuia and Chechnya.

A powerful mean to heal the wounds of this war is to establish wide-spread understanding that all citizens of Russia must defend their common homeland. The most effective way to achieve this aim is through a new national ideology - eurasianism, that can embrace any social-political structure. The only alternative to this development is a dreadful scenario of Russian Federation falling apart, followed by chaos and misiry for its population.

Chechnya demonstrates a case of federal government in Moscow neglecting and later dealing with islam factor inside Russia. It is the "first circle" of Moscow's relations with the world of Islam.

Nagorny Carabah.

The most prolonged and internationally known conflict on the "near abroad" territory is a case of Nagorny Karabah (N.K.). It has an extremely intricate history.

After the October revolution in 1917 new sovereign states reemerge in the Caucasus region, among them Armenia and Azerbaidjan. Immediately they began to put forward territorial claims to each other. The most disputed area was N.K. A war started and people were killed. In July 1921 N.K. was included into Azerbaidjan. This decision was fraught with danger, the population of this area was almost entirely armenian. Even in 1989, after 68 years, armenians constituted 77% (146.000 people) of the population. Three times, in 1945, 1966 and 1977, Armenia petitioned Moscow with requests to stop "assimilation" of N.K. by Azerbaidjan and to return the territory to Armenia but all in vain.

On February 20 1988 N.K. session of the regional council took a decision to demand integration of N.K. into Armenia. Azerbaidjan refused and in 1991 an open war between them started. Military hostilities continued until 1994. By that time 85% of N.K. territory was controled by a new N.K. Republic (N.K.R.), which had been declaired by local authorities.

From 1994 to 1997 on the territory of N.K.R. there is a state of a ceasefire followed by a shaky peace. In its relations with the world of Islam the N.K conflict is a political challange for Russia. Many muslim countries support Azerbaidjan. Azeri authorities declare that Russia alone could be an effective arbitrator of the conflict but does not use its influence and power to achieve this. They also point to the fact that there are russian military bases in Armenia and that Moscow gives Erevan financial aid. The latest Treaty of Friendship, signed between Moscow and Erevan, reaffirms Baku's fears.

In recent months Baku has intensified its diplomatic offensive on the basis of oil diplomacy and the North Caucasus instability. Under these circumstances problems of the Caspian sea oil and the pipe lines to carry it to the West clearly became a strong factor of influence in the future of N.K. conflict. Baku insists that it has a strong legal case against Erevan which is accused of "naked agression".

On its part Armenia's case is based on historical injusties toward N.K. region and the desire of the local population to gain independence from Azerbaidjan. This position is supported by declaration in 1991 of N.K.R. Its leadership, supported by the population, declaires that they will never agree to be a part of Azerbaidjan. They insist that the war they waged against Baku was "a just war". At the same time they agree that the only way to solve the conflict is through negotiations. The latest move, made by Armenia in March 1997, was to appoint the president of N.K.R. as the prime-minister of Armenia. This is considered to be an answer to the tilt of the West in favour of Azerbaidjan.

A number of "players" in N.K. conflict is on the rise. Nowadays besides Armenia, Azerbaidjan, N.K.R. and Russia we see Turkey, Iran, Georgia. Turkey openly supports Azerbaidjan. Its position is based on the ideas of Panturkism. After the fall of the USSR Turkey became active not only in the Caucasus but also in Central Asia. It supports Baku in the U.N.O. and the Organization of Islamic Conference and at all levels of peace talks. It is strongly influenced, as well as Georgia, by "oil-diplomacy" factor.

There is a growing influence in the Caucasus-Caspian region of Iran. Its attitude towards N.K. conflict is balanced and goes against any other country's overdose influence.

The West, especially the U.S.A., strives to isolate Iran in the region that is a natural persian geopolitical field. Tehran foreign policy here is flexible, is not hostile to Baku but at the same time takes into consideration Armenia's and Russia's interests.

Any plans to isolate Iran in the region and from the resolution of N.K. conflict are unwise. Apart from other factors, has 132 kilometres border with the territory of Azerbaidjan, occupied by Armenia.

In the years to come Iran will play in the Caucasus and Central Asia an important role of an influential regional power. There exists great potential for improvement of its relations with Russia, especially if Moscow develops in this region a stratagy, based not only "on oil" but a much broader approach of acquiring new partners and allies.

Special regional interests.

As a rule, regional as well as local powers are more sensitive than far away states in conglomeration of real-life factors that cannot be evaluated en masse. I shall give just one example to explain this point through the prism of Russia- Islam relationship.

Let us consider problems of the Caspian sea. Western oil companies put oil factor in front of all the others. Their foreign policy is in a deep shadow of oil-well towers all over the Middle East and recently Caspian area. But for local powers oil factor is only one of several important.

Governments and, of course, multinationals are blinded by the glint of huge profits from oil extraction and may forget the glimmer of another "black gold" - the caviar, that is the most precious sea product. Caspian sea is a unique ecosystem with the abundence of sturgeon, sterlets and beluga fish. Russia, Iran, Azerbaidjan, Kazahstan, Turkmenia - all of them are deeply interested to prevent the catastrophy that occure if oil and gas extraction suffocates caspian biological habitat.

Oil and gas are non-returnable natural resources, fish may feed local and world population for many centuries. Oil reserves in the Caspian sea are estimated at 7-10 billion tons. They will not last more than 50 years. Is it worth to rush into oil politics and geostrategy at the cost of biological depriviation of the Caspian sea?

Russia, CIS and muslim states must behave gingerly in order to save the regional habitat. To hope that for some reason other governments will do the job would be a disgrace.

The N.K. problem belongs to the "second circle" of the Russia-Islam relations. These problems develop towards internalization, with many actors involved. Adherents of "one-polar world" are ready to declare new areas as their "zones of vital interests". Such actions will lead to new tensions and alliences.

Russia and the arabs: is strategic partnership possible?

There are many factors, present and potential, that point to the conclusion: the most important group of muslim nations, with whom Russia can develop strategic partnership, are arab states.

Russia itself is a part of a muslim world, with endemic islam population. The proportion of the latter is increasing.

One billion muslims form a majority in 48 countries. It is also a rapidly growing minority in Europe and the USA.

Muslims vary, but Islam is a faith of peace, brotherhood and social justice. A lot of russian politicians should discard simplifications, inplanted into their minds by anti-islamic zealots in the news media. The aim of the anti-islamism is to undermine everything that unites the arabs: arab nationalism, islamic revivalism and secular nationalism.

An overall projection in the mass-media is of "a militant islamic fundamentalism". In the second half of the 20-th century this was a prevailing picture of a muslim world not only in the West but to some extent in Russia. At the same time it is a well-known fact that arab nationalism was supported by the soviet foreign policy.

In the 21-st century Russia will deal with arab countries as a christian-muslim eurasian civilization where all extremist groups gradually will be marginalized and social reforms implemented not through the barrel of a gun but by building mosques, schools, hospitals, banks, industrial and agricultural enterprises.

Russia must not become a part of a new holy Crusade against "the danger of islamic fundamentalism" under the pretext of "islamic terror". Enough is enough. In the present world terrorism does exist, people do murder each other, military assaults, even with mass-destruction weapons, take place, all kinds of political vendettas rage on, broad military actions, known as "local conflicts", engulf many regions. Some governments behave as if application of a regular army against "terrorists" gives them indulgence from the crime. They are deeply wrong. Whether civilians are killed and wounded by government forces or the other, the nature of such actions, especially if they are conducted on a foreign territory, is criminal. The only radical remedy against this plague is to outlaw terrorism as such, no matter if it is governmental or non-governmental. Not a single life of a civilian should be jeopardized in any kind of conflicts.

For Russia the only option to find peace through the maze of local, regional and global conflicts is to conduct the policy of flexibility, pragmatism and tolerance. Islamic revivalism will develop not only along the path of liberal or progressive secularism and westernization of society but also, when dictated by specifics of a local comunity, by the road of peaceful islamic fundamentalism. The latter is not "violence" but a way of life.

Inside Christianity, Islam and other religions extrimists exist. They must be dealt with by national governments and not by any "world policeman" with a double-standart approach. A firm political will and desire of the Russian government to promote relations with the muslims without messianic zeal, in accordance with international law, the values of which are forgotten by many governments, is the best proof that Moscow has lately embarked on the road of the New Russian foreign policy. This strategy is in the making and does not contradict any believes. It is, in fact, a policy of political pluralism.

This emerging flexible political base for relations with the arabs is the most effective and promissing. It is also supported by the legacy of the Soviet foreign policy towards them. The base of the present russian geostrategy is becoming much broader. Russian actions in the East and the South are the beginning of the new Moscow's geopolicy.


History of mankind is in many ways mysterious. Its puzzle picture quite often evades "the onle right answer". Intricate and even cunning events multiply and often prevent easy judgements. People often explain history and its happenings by the "game of circumstances" or devine forces. Others in their judgement rely on laws of history explained by social science.

History to some extent can be explained through common wisdom of mankind reflected in different religions. Bubbling activities of individuals take place in the ordered complexity around them. Historical events are not only Happenings, they are partly made by people, not only heroes but masses that are led by them.

In the Universe humans are not passive objects whose destiny is only to contemplate Life. Science is not just pure knowledge, but how it is used under different circumstances. Rationalism of knowledge must go hand in hand with religious beliefs. Historians are incapable to understand everything.

As for politics, one truth is clear. The Man and his World were created to stay alive and not to be lost in brutal conflicts and wars. I hope that new national geostrategy of Russia will rest on this devine presumption.